Food and population: a long view by Clifton B. Luttrell
W/ Vt ITH the sharp filcrease in food prices in 1973
and 1974, the world food-population ratio began to
receive increasing attention, Writers in both profes-
sional journals and more widely read magazines have
pointed to the prospect of rising world food costs and
starvation in the years ahead.1
The recent predictions, that per capita food
production will decline, are consistent with the basic
classical argument of the early 1800’s that the growth
rate of the world population tends to exceed that of
food production. These views are founded on pre-
sumptions of major constraints to increasing crop
yields and a continuing high rate of world population
growth.2 The alleged constraints to food production
growth, however, give little recognition to the diver-
sity of the food-population problems among different
economies of the world, let alone take account of the
economic factors which affect the incentive to reduce
food production costs.
This article postulates that the United States and
the other more developed nations (MDCs) will not
experience rising real food costs over the longer run
despite some increase in the early 1970s and the
numerous reports which point to world famine. It
hypothesizes that the food-population ratio in the
various nations of the world is largely a function of
the size and composition of per capita wealth, and
that per capita wealth remains near the subsistence
level for most of the less developed nations (LDCs).
Consequently, they are still subject to periodic fam-
ines. However, famines in the LDCs will not spill
over into the MDCs which have gradually increased
per capita wealth and been free from famines for
more than a century.
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Predictions of rising food scarcity and limits to
productivity growth are not of recent origin. Such
allegations can be traced back several centuries. They
became widely accepted following the writings of the
classical economists in the late l700s and early 1800s.
Giovanni Botero in 1589 postulated that population
tends to increase to the limits imposed by the means
of subsistence.3 Adam Smith contended that the
means of subsistence limits the multiplication of
humans and all other species of animals.4 He and
~JosephA. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 254-55.
~Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modem
Library, 1937), pp. 79, 81.
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1968); Lawrence A. Mayer, “We Can’t Take Food for
Granted Anymore,” Fortune (February 1974), pp. 85-89
and 132-36; Gene Karetz, “The Global Food Shortage,”
Business Week, June 8, 1974, p. 63; “The Fat Years and
the Lean,” The Economist, (November 2, 1974), p. 19;
“Formula for World Famine?”, U.S. News and World Report,
January 28, 1974, pp. 50-52; Wayne Bartholomew and Ceorge
A. Wing, “Profiles of the Future, Arab Petroleum = American
Food,” Business Horizons (Indiana University Graduate
School of Business, Vol. XVII, Number 6, December 1974),
pp. 5-14 “In the End, Even U.S. May Not & Able to Feed
the Worfd,” U.S. News and World Report, May 27, 1974, pp.
57-58; Lester R. Brown and Erik P. Eckholm, “Food and
Hunger: The Balance Sheet,” Challenge (September-October
1974), pp. 12-24; Willard W. Cochrane, “Food, Agriculture.
and Rural Welfare: Domestic Policies in an Uncertain
World,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol-
ume 56, Number 5 (December 1974), pp. 989-997; and
“U.S. Food Power: Ultimate Weapon in World Politics,”
Business Week, December 15, 1975, pp. 54-60.
2
hhrlich, Population Bomb, pp. 44 and 46-47; Brown arid
Eckholm, “Food and Hunger,” pp. 12-24; and Cochrane,
“Food Agriculture and Rural Welfare,” pp. 989-91.
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other classical economists viewed the food producing
qualities of land as being highly inelastic with re-
spect to other inputs. They believed that any gains in
yields resulting from new technology would be quickly
offset by population growth.5
David Ricardo, a leading proponent of the classical
view on returns to land, reasoned that (1) rent arises
because of differences in soil fertility; (2) the value
of production on the unit of least fertile land in use
will only be sufficient to cover costs of nonland
inputs thus yielding no rent; (3) labor values are
determined by returns to labor on the less fertile
acres; and (4) marginal productivity of labor will
decline over time as the population increases and ad-
ditional marginal acres are brought under cultivation.
The proponents of this view held that the total
volume of real wages is relatively fixed, being limited
to a worker’s output on the least fertile land times
the total number of workers. Consequently, as popu-
lation increases, per capita real wages were expected
to decline, and starvation among the marginal non-
landed classes was expected to become widespread.
On the other hand, returns to the landed classes
would tend to rise since the difference in yield be-
tween the more fertile and the marginal acres svould
be greater and rents higher.°
Thomas Malthus, the leading proponent of the
classical starvation view, contended that there is no
limit to the prolific reproduction of people except
when imbalances restilting from their crowding in-
terfere with each other’s means of subsistence. He
postulated that under favorable conditions the means
of subsistence might increase in an arithmetic ratio,
whereas population tends to increase in a geometric
ratio, doubling each tsventy-five years.7
James Mill and other early 19th century writers
further developed the subsistence argument into a
wages-fund theory. Mill substituted all forms of capi-
tal for land in the Malthusian model and argued
that a decrease in the ratio of capital to population
over time will cause (real) wages to decline, imply-
ing a reduction in per capita output of all goods and
services including food. Like Malthus he believed that
population tended to increase at a faster rate than
5
Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pp. 94-95; David Ricardo,
The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London:
J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1948), p. 279-80, and Thomas
Robert Malthns, On Population, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb
(New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 151-57.
SRicardo, Principles, pp. 273-92.
‘Malthus, On Population, pp. 154, 156.
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MAJOR FAMtNES IN WESTERN EUROPE
Date Place Estimated Death





1235 England 20,000 (rn London)
1315 17 Central and 10% of population over
Wentern Europe wide area
347-48 Italy N.A.
1693 France NA.
1769 France s% of population
1816 17 Ireland 737,000
1846-47 Ireland 1,000 000
NA not evadabi
Source: E cycles, da H ‘tan a, 1970 at, s-v “Famine”
H cyelaped,a 4,ne ;ea,uz 1970 S., a v, “Famin&~
capital, and was held in check by the limits on real
wages, i.e. the means of subsistence.t
Early %7je•u’s Consistent. .rt~.ffltt4.nj~r~
The classical food supply views appear to explain
population growth throughout most of recorded his-
tory. Prior to the industrial revolution in the lSOOs,
per capita wealth and production was relatively low
throughout the world and famines occurred frequently
even in the more developed areas. Some periods of
major famine reported in Western Europe are listed
in Table I. The great Irish famine of 1846-47 follow-
ing the failure of the Irish potato crop was the last
major famine to occur during peacetime in either
\Vestern Europe or the United States. The population
of Ireland declined more than two million, or about
25 percent as a result of the famine, related deaths,
and migrations.
1 ci r I ai 0 (0 no v S
World food production per capita has trended up
in recent decades, but the overall improvement has
been relatively modest. Food production per capita
rose one percent per year during the decade 1954-64
and about 0.8 of a percent per year during the decade
1964-74 (Table II). Total food production rose at
rates of 3.0 and 2.7 percent, respectively, in the two
decades. However, population growth was maintained
at a 1.9 percent rate throughout both decades, off-
setting much of the increase in food production.
t
James Mill, Elements of Political Economy, Reprints of Eco-
nomic Classics (New York: August M. Kelley, Bookseller,
1963), pp. 40-50.
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Furthermore, the rate of increase in food produc-
tion per person varied widely among the world econ-
omies. Dnring the decade ending in 1974 all the pen
capita increase occurred in the MDCs. The rate of
increase in total food production in the LDCs de-
clined from 3.1 to 2.6 percent per year from the
decade ending in 1964 to the decade ending in 1974,
about the same as that in the MDCs. However, the
population growth rate in the LDCs rose from 2.4
percent in the decade ending in 1964 to 2.6 percent
in the latter decade, whereas the population growth
rate in the MDC5 declined from 1.3 to 1.0 percent
(Table II). The rise in population during the latter
decade in the LDCs exactly offset the increase in
total food output while food production per capita
continued up in the MDCs at about the same rate as
in the earlier decade, Furthermore, more than a third
of the LDCs experienced a decline in per capita
food production during the 20 years ending in 1972.
Many people in the LDCs, which include Latin
America, and most of Asia and Africa, probably
remain near the Malthusian level of subsistence,
These nations have relatively high rates of population
growth and low rates of capital accumulation and
productivity per capita both on their farms and in
other industries, They add about 61 million to the
world’s population each year and account for 86 per-
cent of the world’s annual population increase.9 More
recent comparisons indicate a leveling off in the popu-
lation growth rates of these regions; however, there
is still little tendency for their rates of population
growth to decline.
Reflecting the low productivity levels in the LDCs,
their diets generally remain near the subsistence level.
°United States Department of Agriculture, The World Food
Situation and Prospects to 1985, FAE Report No. 98, 1974,
pp. 12-14 and 75.
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In 1970 per capita calorie and protein consumption
in these nations averaged only 69 and 60 percent,
respectively, of such consumption in North America.
Furthermore, the proportion of food obtained from
animal products was only about one-fifth of that in
the U.S.1°
If the LDCs produced a large quantity of non-food
products, they could, as Japan has done, achieve
higher dietary standards by exchanging such products
for food produced by the MDCs. But, total produc-
tion of all goods per person in the LDCs is relatively
low and consists largely of subsistence type products
used domestically. In 1972, for example, national in-
come totaled only $55 billion in India. $54 billion in
Brazil, $16 billion in Turkey, $7 hilhon in Colombia,
and $2 billion in Ethiopia. National income totaled
$1,041 bilhon in the United States.” A few of the
LDCs produce sizable quantities of crops and other
commodities for export such as coffee and soybeans
in Brazil, sugar in the Philippines, palm oil in Ma-
laysia, feed grains in Argentina, and petroleum in
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), but as a general rule their low rate of
production does not provide a sufficient quantity of
foreign exchange to trade for large quantities of ad-
ditional food.
Saving and investment in capital goods are appar-
ently increasing in the LDCs at a higher rate than
population growth, indicating some gains in the per
capita stock of capital. The Commission on Interna-
tional Development found that savings and gross in-
vestment in these nations totaled 15 and 17.8 percent,
mOFood and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics
(September 1974), pp. 3-6; and USDA, World Agricultural
Situation (December 1973), p. 51.
ilunited Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (February
1978).
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respectively, of Gross National Product (GNP) dur-
ing the period 1960-67. However, saving and invest-
ment relative to GNP is still very low in the LDCs,
averaging well below that of the MDGs.’2
Foreign aid has been a source of new capital in
many of the LDCs. Such aid has been evident in
providing machinery and equipment for industry, for
building roads and raihvays, ports, fertilizer plants,
and irrigation facilities. Some of the LDCs, especially
the more advanced, have received sizable amounts of
private capital. However, few LDCs present a favor-
able climate for private investment, either from for-
eign or local sources. As pointed out by the Commis-
sion on International Development, “too few of these
countries recognize thetremendous contribution which
private investment can make to economic develop-
ment and in an environment unsympathetic to all
private entrepreneurship it is hardly surprising that
foreign investors sense danger.”” As indicated by
D. Gale Johnson a strong case can he made that the
major barriers to growth in the LDCs are political in
nature. He contends that the barriers to rising per
capita food supplies are neither primarily economic
nor scientific. However, he suggests that conditions
for significant increases in food production include:
a major expansion of agricultural research in the de-
veloping countries themselves, an adequate supply of
modern inputs required to increase yields, the im-
provement and expansion of the irrigated area, in-
centives to farmers to make the required changes
(including the expansion of the cultivated area), and
improvements in transportation, marketing, and proc-
essing institutions and facilities. In addition, increased
investment in human capital and improved com-
munications is desirable, not only because of its con-
tribution to increased agricultural output but also
because of the need to assist farm people in the long-
run adjustments they must make to economic growth.’4
The relatively low level of capital formation in the
LDCs carries over into their investment in knowledge
related to food production. In 1965 expenditures on
agricultural research and extension services in the
LDCs relative to farm production was only about
one-half of that in the MDCs.”
“Commission on International Development, Partners in De-




D. Gale Johnson, World Food Problems and Prospects
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, June 197o), pp. 77 and 79.
“Robert E. Evenson and Yoav Kisler, ‘<Investment in Agri-
cultural Research and Extension: A Survey of International
The LDCs have achieved some growth in recent
years increasing their real GNP at an estimated aver-
age rate of 4.8 percent from 1950 to 1967, or con-
siderably faster than that of the MDCs during their
early stage of development.” However, because of
the accelerating rate of population growth, per capita
income growth has been relatively modest, and many
of the LDCs have realized very little, if any, per
capita income gains.
Individual nations formerly in the LDC group have
managed to move into the MDC group over tune.
Occasionally a less developed country begins to make
progress. Once a significant amount of progress is
made and the political climate for private investment
is improved, imported private funds along with en-
hanced private domestic savings become major
sources of development capital. Then the LDCs tend
to move into the more developed category of na-
tions. Notable examples of such movements in recent
decades have been Japan, Israel, and Greece. Fur-
them-more, once substantial progress has been made
few nations have dropped back into the low-pro-
ductivity class. As long as low production persists,
however, the food supply-population situation in most
of these natiomms will not lmave a major impact on
food prices in the MDCs.
Food Still Limits Fopzaatzon Growth in.
Sonic Areas
Classical theories that population is limited by the
means of subsistence are consistent with the experi-
ence in many of the LDCs. People still exist near
the subsistence level in many of these nations, and a
year or two of below-average crop yields can result
in famine, severe malnutrition, and a slower growth
or decline in population. India, for example, has ex-
perienced a number of major famines since 1800.
Eleven major famines were reported in some parts
of the nation since then, as shown in Table III, The
longest interval between the major famines listed in
these sources was from 1900 to 1943 and other
sources list a number of famines even during this
interval.’7
The preponderance of evidence indicates that low
per capita production has reduced the rate of popu-




Com,nission on International Development, Partners in De-
velopment, p. 27.
“See, for example, Rajpat Rai, England’s Debt to India (New
York: B. ‘N. Huebsch), 1917, p. 267; and Dr. M. Arokiaswami
and T. M. Royappa, The Modern Economic History of India
(Madras-2, India: Newman Book House, 1959), p. 335.
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lation growth in India during the past century from
what it would have otherwise been. Ansley Coale
and Edgar Hoover, using census data, show a small
decline in the nation’s population from 1891 to 1901,
and growth of less than one-sixth of one percent per
year from 1891 to 1921. They found a fairly constant
birth rate, but fluctuating death rates in response to
major epidemics and famines.’8 Rajpat Rai estimated
that if the famines had not occurred, the population
of India would have been about 40 million greater
that it was in 19O1.’°
The acceleration of India’s population growth rate
in recent decades is also consistent with the classical
population-subsistence thesis. For example, during
the forty years from 1891 to 1931, the population re-
mained relatively stable, rising only 0.2 of a percent
per year. Available production data for this period
indicate little change in per capita wealth and in-
come. Cohn Clark calculated that output of all
goods and services per breadwinner remained un-
changed from 1909-13 to 1935-38. On the basis of
NBER estimates CNP per person in the United States
during this period grew at an average rate of .9 per-
cent per year.2°Coale and Hoover found that since
~
8
Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, Population Growth
and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 30-31.
m9
Rajpat Rai, England’s Debt, p. 266.
‘°ColinClark, The Economics of 1960 (London: Macmillan
and Company, Ltd., 1944), chart under back cover, and
U.S. Department of Commerce, Long-Term Economic
Growth 1860-1965.
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1931 both population and food production in India
have increased rapidly compared to the earlier pe-
riod. Population has increased at a 1,8 percent annual
rate and food production at a 1.6 percent rate.2’
The somewhat faster rate of population growth rel-
ative to food production in India in recent decades
can be attributable to a larger volume of food im-
ports, improved internal transportation which facili-
tated food movements among the various provinces,
and improved health practices which limit the deaths
caused by diseases associated with malnutrition. Since
the late 1940s imports of food have averaged about
5 percent of total usage, whereas previously the na-
tion was largely self-sufficient. A large percentage of
the food imports have been financed by the MDCs
under various government aid programs. Farm com-
modity imports from the U.S., financed largely through
Government aid programs, averaged almost $300 mil-
lion per year during the last txvo decades.” Sub-
sidized food shipments by the United States to India
began in 1935-38, but were relatively small until the
1950s. Then food shipments began to increase sharply
under the authority granted in Public Law 480 which
provided for the exchange of food for nonconvertible
Indian currency.
India has been able to increase yields and produc-
tion of cereal grains hut the gains were not sufficient
to offset expanding consumption. From 1960-62 to
1969-71 average yields in India rose at an annual rate
of 2 percent and population rose at a rate of 2.6 per-
cent. Production of grains rose at a 3 percent rate, as
the acreage planted to grains was increased, hut
grain consumption rose at a 3.4 percent rate.2’
While food export subsidy programs of the U.S.
and other MDCs have prevented major famines in
recent years, the basic causes of malnutrition in India
and some other LDCs have not been eliminated.
Professor Theodore MT. Schultz, who has studied the
effects of aid, concluded that such shipments of food
products cannot solve the basic malnutrition prob-
lem,24 In a similar view Flarry Walters reported
increasing food deficits and a growing dependence
on food imports in the traditional agricultural econo-
2t
Coale and Hoover, Population Growth, p. 30; UN Statistical
Yearbook; and World Almanac, 1974 ed., S.V. “India”.
22USDA Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States,
(May 1974), p. 24.
23U.S.D.A., The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985,
p. 18.
24Theodore W. Schultz, Economic Crises in World Agriculture
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p.
3, 19.
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mies such as India. Thus, the age-old problem of
starvation and famine has not disappeared for many
people.
Technical assistance programs designed to enhance
food output in the LDCs likewise have not signifi-
candy altered their food-population relationships.
Schultz concluded that in Latin America little real
per capita gain has resulted from our contribution of
$44 million to such programs from 1943 to 1955. Nine
Latin American countries lost ground on a per capita
basis, two of which had no programs; and eleven
countries gained, one of which received no assistance.
On average Latin America’s agricultural production
increased no faster than the rate of population growth.
Flence, very little association existed between such
programs and the well-being of the people.’°
Rt.;t Many \‘atfr•inr Are hA Longer
S•t.thiect to Famines
In contrast to the continued threat of famine in
many nations, for more than a century no famines
have occurred in most of the MDCs. These nations,
including the United States, Canada. Western Europe,
the U.S.S.R., Australia, and New Zealand, have had
relatively how rates of population growth and high
rates of capital formation and production. Their pop-
ulations grew at an average rate of 1.3 percent per
year from 1952 to 1962 and at a 1.0 percent rate from
1.962 to 1972 (Table II). They produced three-fourths
of the world’s food output in 1973 and consumed 50
“Harry Walters, The World Food Situation (Report to the
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry for the 1975 U.S.
Agricultural Outlook, Decesnber 23, 1974), pp. 20-29.
‘
8
Schnltz, Economic Crises, p. 55.
percent more food per capita than the LDCs. While
accounting for only one-fourth of the increase in
world population since the mid-1950s they accounted
for three-foui-ths of the increase in world food
output.’7
Those MDCs such as Japan which are not self
sufficient in food production produce large quanti-
ties of other goods in which they have greater rela-
tive efficiency, and exchange such goods with other
nations that can produce food more cheaply. Hence,
even though they possess few food producing re-
sources, they do not have a serious food-population
problem.
Return to Famines Unlikely in the 5T5~
Despite the sharp increase in world food costs in
recent years there is little evidence that the MDCs
are returning to the economic status of the LDCs,’8
Real food costs over the long run reflect basic farm
product supply and demand conditions, and evidence
does not support the view that these conditions have
changed toward a reduction in the real food supply
in the United States and other MDCs. The long-run
food supply factors after adjustment for inflation have
moved sharply counter to the classical predictions
of universal famines for more than half a century. In
contrast to the classical view that crop yields are
relatively fixed, and that real returns to land will rise
with population growth, the evidence in recent dec-
ades supports the opposite view. The importance of
the original properties of the soils has declined rela-
tive to that of other investments in determining crop
yields.
Crop yields in the U.S. were relatively stable from
the l860s, when yield data were first recorded, until
the early 1930s, tending to confirm the classical
views. Corn yields averaged 24.3 bushels per acre in
the four years 1866-1869, inclusive, and 24.2 bushels
per acre in 1928-31 (Table IV). Rye yields were like-
wise relatively stable during this period. Wheat and
oat yields rose somewhat hut har]ey declined. In
contrast to the stability of yields prior to the early
1930s, however, yields since then have increased
sharply. Corn yields have niore than tripled, wheat
and rye have more than doubled, and oats and barley
have almost doubled.
“U.S.D.A., The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985,
pp. 14-16.
‘8For an opposite view, see Ehrlich, Population Bomb, pp. 44
and 46-47; Brown and Eckholm, “Food and Hunger,’ pp.
12-24; and Cochrane, “Food Agriculture and Rural Welfare,”
pp. 989-91.
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Rising yields since the 1930s largely reflect the
increasing application to land of capital investments
in man-made productive factors. The quantity of such
yield increasing investments is determined by relative
prices and the incentive for invention and discovery.
Inventions and discoveries have contributed to more
viable seed, heartier and more productive plants,
shorter growing season requirements, lower-cost fer-
tilizers, a more balanced supply of plant nutrients,
improved weed, disease, and insect controls, crop
rotations, soil management, and improved planting,
cultivating and harvesting procedures. More efficient
machinery and equipment, has led to efficiencies in
planting, tihlage, harvesting, irrigation, and drainage.
Real wages in the U.S. have also failed to follow
the predictions of Mill and other proponents of the
classical thesis who contended that population would
rise faster than capital formation and reduce wages
to the subsistence level. Instead of remaining near
the subsistence level real wages in manufacturing
have increased in each 20-year period during the last
60 years (Table ‘S/). Real wages rose at an average
rate of two percent per year during the 60-year
period. Hence, in contrast to the food-population sub-
sistence theories espoused by the classical economists,
major gains in per capita wealth, production, and
income, have occurred in the United States. The
classical theories of relatively fixed soil productivity,
rising rents, and slow rate of capital formation did
not envision the extent of man’s ability to increase
production in the MDCs. Their population theories
overestimated man’s incentive to multiply and under-
estimated his wealth accumulations and productive
capacity in these nations. As a consequence, the sup-
ply of food and other real goods has expanded at a
faster rate than population growth.
Recent Food Price Disturbances Do Not
Reflect a Change in Trend
While real food costs in the United States rose
sharply in 1973 and 1974, evidence points to short-
run explanations for much of the increase. A number
of short-run factors have had a stimulative effect on
food prices. Covernment food subsidies to lower in-
come groups have increased sharply, tending to en-
hance total food demand since 1969. The total value
of Federal distributions under the Food Stamps, Food
Distribution, and Child Nutrition programs of the U.S.
Depaitnent of Agriculture rose from $1.2 billion in
1969 to $5.5 billion in 1974, and to $6.8 billion in 1975.
While these programs may he permanent, the mo-
mentmn of their upward pressure on food prices
should decline if fewer families are hereafter added
tothe food aid lists.
Demand for food for export was enhanced by
relatively unfavorable weather over part of the world,
The much publicized Russian wheat sales and the
larger grain sales to Western Europe in 1972 reflected
poor crop gro~vingconditions and a sharp increase
in production of livestock products in these areas.. A
sharp cutback in Peruvian fish meal production in late
1972 and 1973. a source of protein for animal feed,
also contributed to higher demand for U.S. livestock
feed.
A number of factors on the supply side of the
domestic market also contributed to the food price
increases. Wage-price controls, environmental regula-
tions, relatively poor domestic weather conditions, a
sharp increase in fuel costs as a result of the OPEC
petroleum monopoly, and changes in the international
terms of trade all tended to reduce domestic food
supplies from what they would otherwise be.
Domestic wage and price controls in effect during
the early 1970s were especially harmful to the food
industry. They held the prices of some inputs, such as
fertilizer, below long-run equilibrium levels, which
reduced the incentive to expand output. Conse-
quently, fertilizer “shortages” developed and, once
the controls were hfted, fertihzer prices rose above
long-run equilibrium levels. Both the “shortages” and
the higher input prices, which followed the lifting
of the controls, tended to increase food costs. The
freeze on meat prices in the summer of 1973 was also
harmful. It reduced the incentive for fanners to pro-
duce, thus delaying increases in livestock production.
Environmental and safety programs imposed on a
wide scale have tended to reduce the supply of all
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cals for crops and on growth additives for livestock
feed have both tended to increase farm production
costs and reduce food supplies. The OPEC oil cartel
which quadrnpled the export price of oil has been an
important cost-increasing factor since late 1973. En-
ergy costs quickly permeate throughout the economy
and affect costs of producing all goods and services.
The depreciation of the dollar relative to other na-
tion’s currencies in 1971 was likewise a short-run cost
increasing factor. It changed the relative prices of
internationally traded goods. Prices of domestic goods
to foreign purchasers were reduced and prices of
foreign goods to U.S. purchasers were increased.
Consequently exports of U.S. agricultural products
rose and imports of goods declined resulting in fewer
goods for domestic use including food.
None of the above factors appear to be the type
that will alter trend movements. Some, such as the
environmental protection measures and the oil cartel,
will cause only a once-and-for-all reduction in the
food supply (reduced quantity supplied at any given
price) unless further restrictive measures are taken,
On the other hand, per capita wealth is likely to
continue upward and the flow of cost-reducing tech-
nologies into the food industry is likely to be main-
tamed causing the supply of food to continue to
increase.
The turnaround in food production and price pros-
pects for food this year relative to other prices is
evidence that food prices rose above longer-run equi-
librium levels following the short-run disturbances in
1972 and 1973. The disturbances largely affected the
prices of grain and other livestock feed. Average feed
prices increased sharply leading to reduced output
and higher prices for animal food products. But, fol-
lowing the large crop harvested last fall, grain prices
declined sharply and all food prices began to level
off. Consequently, the spread between food and all
consumer prices, that had developed since 1972, be-
gan to close (see chart). During the period of sharply
increasing food prices, the percent of U.S. disposable
personal income spent on food at home rose, increas-
ing from 12.5 percent in 1972 to 13.1 percent in 1975.
With the turnaround in food prices relative to other
consumer goods, the percent of personal income spent
on food may resume its downward trend in 1976.
S•n•nr•m.ary ana• Concins-ion
Fear of famines is not of recent origin. The tendency
for population growth to exceed that of food produc-
tion has been recognized as critical to the well-being
of man throughout history. From time to time some
analysts propose that the solution to this imbalance
should receive top priority. Others, however, view it
as a continuous age-old problem associated wfth
wealth accumulation and economic growth. To the
latter group the food shortages and starvation in the
LDCs is another episode in the classical model of
economic development and a problem not subject to
solution by “crash” programs.
The threat of famine is not worldwide. Essentially
two worlds exist in terms of per capita food sup-
plies .— one, the LDCs, in which growth of popula-
tion tends to approach that of capital accumulation
and productivity, and to be limited by the means of
subsistence, and another, the MDCs, in which capital
and real per capita income growth is at relatively
high rates and population growth is at a relatively
low rate.
Famines in the LDCs during the past two decades
have been inhibited by food aid programs of the more
developed nations. This aid, however, has not im-
proved their per capita productivity. In contrast it
may have worsened their food-population relationship.
The success of technical assistance programs for
the LDCs has likesvise been questioned. Some have
suggested that a large portion of future aid be chan-
neled toward a major expansion of research in the
LDCs themselves. It is also apparent that progress
toward increasing total output could be quickened
by providing a more favorable political climate for
saving and capital investment in the LDCs. With a
more favorable climate for capital inveshnent, tech-
nicians which accompany such investment serve to
hasten the technical training of the local work force,
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an important factor in achieving rapid gains in
production.
While starvation will likely remain a major prob-
lem in the LDCs until a sizable increase is achieved
in per capita wealth and production, a downtrend in
the food supply is not likely to occur elsewhere. Sup-
ply and demand conditions in most of the LDCs do
not have a major impact on food supplies and prices
in the more affluent economies. Although they re-
ceive gifts from the MDCs, and some export sizable
quantities of goods, most of the LDCs have a rela-
tively small impact on world food prices.
Consequently there is little danger that starva-
tion and famines in the LDCs will spill over into the
more developed nations. The MDCs have in recent
years experienced some short-run reversals in real
food cost but the basic trend in food costs continues
downward. The growth of capital, technology, and
knowledge in these nations has continued. These
factors increase man’s ability to produce goods and
services. Moreover, there has been no tendency in
recent years for their populations to increase at a
faster rate than heretofore. Instead of accelerating,
their population growth rate has declined. Conse-
quently, instead of a change toward scarcity and
famine, once the short-run disturbances are past, the
downtrend in real food costs is likely to be resumed.
If the LDCs increase their wealth and develop
the capacity to expand output of nonfood goods suf-
ficiently to trade for major quantities of food, such
trade would not be detrimental to the well-being of
the MDCs. By trading food freely with such nations
the MDCs would he able to get more goods and
services from theft scarce resources than if they pro-
duced solelyfor their own consumption. Consequently,
the MDCs have nothing to fear from the possibility
of rising productivity and rising food demand in the
LDCs.